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Auguste Blanqui’s Eternity by the Stars (1872) is perhaps 
the only text, across the scattered fragments of his 
œuvre, that poses a genuine problem of interpreta-
tion.1 How could this ultra-voluntarist revolution-
ary come to embrace a vision of the cosmos based 
on endless repetition and the eternal recycling of 
monotonous variation? Blanqui committed his life 
to the idea that deliberate political intervention by 
a small group of activists can change the course of 
history; how, then, should we understand his defence, 
towards the end of his life, of an ‘astronomical 
hypothesis’ that appears to empty historical sequence 
of all meaning and direction? Is Walter Benjamin, 
still Blanqui’s most inluential interlocutor, right to 
suggest that this late text is best read as an expression 
of despair and submission, the inal surrender of a 
heroic but exhausted igure?
If we put Eternity to one side for a moment, one of 
the most striking things about the broad trajectory of 
Blanqui’s political thought, from his irst involvement 
in student protests in the 1820s to his inal polemics 
against religious mystiication and bureaucratic mili-
tarization in the late 1870s, must surely be its internal 
consistency. From his experience in and after the 
street battles that overthrew the Restoration monar-
chy in July 1830, Blanqui drew three lessons that were 
to guide the rest of his long political career, across all 
of its many interruptions.
First and foremost, Blanqui learned that when con-
centrated in a large city like Paris people already have 
all the power they need, if they choose to exercise it, 
to challenge an unjust government and overcome its 
forces of repression. This power endures even when 
it might seem, to detached or hostile observers, in the 
absence of its exercise, that the people have become 
indiferent or resigned. Here the unexpected triumph 
of July 1830 anticipates the equally unexpected insur-
rections of February 1848 and March 1871. However 
it comes to pass, forceful popular mobilization can 
immediately herald the ‘advent of socialism’. ‘In 
the presence of armed proletarians, all obstacles, 
resistances and impossibilities will disappear’,2 for 
revolutionary change stages an abrupt and dramatic 
redistribution of ‘fear and hope’.3 
Second, the unjust societies in which we live are 
organized at all levels in such a way as to ensure that 
the exercise of popular power remains exceptional 
at best and forgotten at worst. So long as people are 
discouraged from choosing the path of freedom and 
insurrection, they will need encouragement from a 
committed and reliable vanguard. Blanqui thought 
that if you can solve the problems posed by organ-
izing and preserving such a vanguard, then you can 
trust its capacity to lead a popular insurrection to 
the threshold of political power, the power that can 
subsequently transform society as a whole. 
Blanqui’s third lesson follows from the temporality 
at work in such social transformation. Social change 
takes time, and as things stand people have been 
socialized in ways that nurture deep-seated deference 
and credulity. However unjust or irrational, what 
is established solicits respect, simply because it is 
successfully established. In the relatively short but 
decisive time that it takes to establish an alterna-
tive, revolutionary leaders must both guard against 
counter-revolutionary betrayal (as occurred follow-
ing the insurrections of 1830, 1848 and 1870–71) and 
protect the people from further miseducation at the 
hands of those who deceive and exploit them (as must 
occur in every pre-communist society).
Reference to these three basic principles may be 
enough to explain the salient features of Blanqui’s 
political life: his rejection of all established forms of 
power; his dogged persistence, after repeated failures, 
death sentences and prison terms, in conspiratorial 
politics; his contempt for the post-revolutionary trai-
tors who abused the people’s trust; his emphasis on 
popular education as the essential basis for a future 
communist society; his hatred of the Church and of 
all religious ideology as the quintessential form of 
miseducation; his valorization of Paris as the leading 
edge of the nation as a whole; his admiration for the 
Hébertiste faction of the irst French Revolution; 
his privileging of political and moral principles over 
economic structures, and so on. 
However it might be interpreted – and however 
routine its dismissal or condemnation – Blanqui’s 
conception of politics appears broadly coherent, and 
37
seems to it smoothly with his broader philosophical 
assumptions about freedom, volition and necessity. 
Blanqui tends to embrace a form of dualism, distin-
guishing between a law-bound sphere of nature on 
the one hand and human capacities of thought and 
freedom on the other. At the anthropological level, 
rather than ‘manual dexterity it is ideas alone that 
make people what they are. The instrument that frees 
us is not our arm but our brain, and the brain lives 
only through education’ and the cultivated activity of 
thought.4 ‘Mankind is thought, and without thought 
man is nothing; what remains is only misery and 
confusion.’5 Blanqui insists on this point: ‘Thought 
is our unique strength’, and ‘we must devote our 
lives to developing and broadening it.’6 By extension, 
and as if to invert the priorities of Marxian historical 
materialism, Blanqui believes that ‘philosophy rules 
the world’7 and that ‘the life of a people is not in 
works of its hands but in what it thinks; material life 
is only the relection of its thought, and as soon as it 
takes the lead and the servant becomes the master, 
it marks the beginning of the end.’8 The material 
laws of nature, as elucidated by science, do not then 
apply directly to the sphere of human action and 
social relation, and any attempt to treat the latter in 
terms of ‘neutral’ scientiic norms violates its object. 
‘Justice is the sole criterion in the application of 
human things.’9 
Blanqui’s dualism, however, is far from absolute, 
and it involves no appeal to something like Kant’s 
noumenal or extra-natural dimension. Like Rousseau 
before him, Blanqui rejects any spiritualist or reli-
gious appeal to an abstract, metaphysical notion of a 
disembodied libre arbitre or ‘free whim’ – a ‘fantasy’ 
that serves only to assign misplaced moral blame to 
the victims of social disadvantage. Blanqui’s note-
books of the late 1860s dwell at length on the ‘recipro-
cal action of the brain on thought and of thought on 
the brain’.10 The exercise of actual thinking, Blanqui 
speculates, is both a material, cerebral process and a 
socialized capacity that can be more or less educated 
or trained, and thus more or less stiled by repression 
and ideological manipulation.11 In keeping with his 
Enlightenment-inspired materialism, Blanqui seeks 
‘to prove that a man is nobody’s puppet’, and that 
while his character and actions may ‘depend on the 
coniguration of his brain’, he also retains ‘the power 
to act on and afect the organ [the brain], to improve 
it continually – and this perfectibility is indeed the 
peculiar character of the species’.12
If la volonté du peuple is not to be confused with 
the complacent fantasy of an indeterminate libre 
arbitre, still less is it to be conlated with any sort of 
natural necessity, cultural destiny or historical ‘fate’. 
There is no contradiction between Blanqui’s early 
recognition that ‘you must never blame anyone other 
than yourself, there is neither chance nor fatality in 
life’,13 and his later emphasis on mutual association 
and solidarity. As soon as Blanqui became involved 
in politics, he began to see that ‘once people begin 
to assist each other, they will ind in their union a 
weapon against the fatalities that rule the world’, and 
he quickly came to recognize that the only consistent 
way of establishing communist forms of association 
must be through a social process that allows each 
individual to choose them, of their own ‘full and free 
will’.14 Early and late, Blanqui assumes as a matter of 
course that government must be ‘of the people and 
by the people’, that laws should be ‘nothing other 
than the expression of the general will’,15 and that the 
only legitimate form of political organization is one 
that ‘expresses the enlightened will of the nation’s 
vast majority’.16 By the same token, when it comes to 
suppressing the ‘depredations of capital’ and enhanc-
ing the well-being and education of this majority, 
as Blanqui will note with disarming sincerity in an 
1870 note on ‘the course we should take’, we should 
remember irst and foremost that the task may be 
‘easier than we think. All we need is good will – for 
it is ill will that we have encountered thus far, be it 
out in the open or in hiding’.17 Our essential political 
questions are thus decided, as Blanqui puts it in a 
widely circulated letter to his friend Maillard in 1852, 
through deliberate ailiation and voluntary commit-
ment, and what one wills and does trumps what one 
is or has been: your background may have pushed you 
in the direction of one class rather than another but 
your actual political ailiation remains a matter of 
choice and will, and ‘thank god there are many bour-
geois who have joined the proletarian camp’, where 
they actively ‘seek real equality between citizens’ and 
the revolutionary ‘destruction of the existing order, 
founded on inequality and exploitation’.18
Blanqui’s ‘classical’ or anti-romantic voluntarism 
has been widely and rightly acknowledged,19 and it 
is what underlies another of his abiding obsessions 
in the years immediately preceding the drafting of 
Eternity by the Stars – his polemic against Comte and 
Comtean positivism. Blanqui is everywhere opposed 
to any determinist account that might justify, on 
either religious or pseudo-scientiic grounds, ‘the 
doctrine of the fatality of social sufering’,20 and he 
singles out positivism as the most pernicious contem-
porary form of fatalism. There can be no defence for 
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those who try to argue that people who happen to be 
poor were on natural or historical grounds somehow 
destined for a life of deprivation and submission. 
If Comte and his followers came to serve as the 
quasi-oicial philosophers of restoration and empire, 
it’s because they invented a suitably ‘modern’ way 
of celebrating what is established on account of its 
mere establishment. They embrace what has come 
to be simply because it prevailed over all that might 
have been. 
From the positivist perspective, ‘everything that 
takes place is good for the mere reason that it takes 
place’, and ‘since things have taken place this way, it 
seems that they could not have happened any other 
way. The fait accompli has an irresistible power. It is 
destiny itself. The mind is overwhelmed by it, and 
dares not revolt against it.’21 Blanqui rages against 
these ‘fatalists of history’, these ‘neo-religious think-
ers, these worshippers of success, who accept and 
acclaim as progress every event, simply because it is 
an event, simply because it represents a step taken by 
humanity under way.’ He goes on to mock their posi-
tion in terms we should bear in mind when reading 
his tract on eternity: 
They think humanity progresses, simply because 
the world turns, because generations of people 
succeed one another, because the day before is not 
the day after, and the day after is more recent than 
the day before.22 
By this logic, in keeping with previous forms of 
theodicy, the positivists ind a way to justify ‘each 
atrocity of the victors’ of history, coldly convert-
ing their every act of violence and oppression into 
a seamless, ‘rule-bound and ineluctable evolution, 
modelled on the evolution of nature’. As with other 
natural processes, they acknowledge this evolution 
without reference to any moral or political ‘criterion 
that might distinguish the good from bad’.23 The 
upshot is abject surrender to the status quo, and an 
‘immoral’ and ‘criminal’ gloriication of the historical 
process that led up to it.24
As Blanqui’s stubborn commitment to planned 
insurrection suggests, there is no conception of 
history that he opposes more strenuously than one 
which airms the immanent necessity of a continu-
ous process, advancing with the inexorable force of 
law-bound motion. ‘The activities of a professional 
conspirator like Blanqui’, as Benjamin observed, 
‘certainly do not presuppose any belief in progress 
– they merely presuppose a determination to do 
away with present injustice’.25 Confronted with an 
accomplished fact, Blanqui concedes with heavy irony 
that it’s always possible to argue that ‘everything is 
fated or fatal [fatal], if you will. It’s enough for a fact 
to be accomplished for it to be declared fatal. On this 
score, everything that happens was fatal and should 
have happened, since it did happen.’26 Blanqui’s whole 
efort, however, is to insist that what thus happened, 
and what in its wake may for the time being still tend 
to happen, provides neither guide nor criteria for 
what should and what actually will happen. 
So far so clear. Then along comes French sur-
render to Prussia in the autumn of 1870, followed 
by the Paris Commune, a further term of seaside 
imprisonment for Blanqui, and the publication of 
the strange little book that is Eternity by the Stars. 
As Benjamin observed when he irst stumbled across 
Eternity in late 1937, its opening pages are ‘banal’, and 
the text, written ‘completely without irony’, does little 
to conceal the limitations of its self-taught author.27 
Compared to his journalism, political tracts and clan-
destine texts on urban warfare, Blanqui’s Eternity 
certainly marks a startling shift in perspective, one 
that its readers have often tried to explain with refer-
ence to the circumstances of its composition. Written 
over the course of 1871 with minimal access to library 
materials, in conditions of absolute isolation, cut of 
from any knowledge of or inluence over the tumul-
tuous events taking place in Paris, Eternity posits a 
vision of the cosmos that might seem to reduce the 
domain of human freedom and political will to trivial 
irrelevance. The universe is now as it ‘already was, 
and so it will always be, without an atom or second 
of variation. There’s nothing new under the sun. All 
that’s done is done, and will be done. … Men of the 
nineteenth century, the hour of our appearances is 
forever ixed, and it will always bring us back the 
same’ as before (EA, 378/55, 381/57). Most damning 
of all, it appears to mark a retreat, or at least some 
uncertainty, with respect to fate and fatalism: ‘One 
can take things by chance or choice, it doesn’t really 
matter, but no one slips away from fatality’ (364/43).
The astronomical hypothesis
The astronomical hypothesis proposed in Eternity 
by the Stars is easily summarized. Blanqui’s point 
of departure is to airm the universe as ‘ininite in 
time and space: eternal, boundless, and indivisible’.28 
The whole of what follows depends on the vertigi-
nous implications that Blanqui draws from this irst 
assertion, and his quintessentially pre-Cantorian pre-
sumption that ininity is non-denumerable, ‘indein-
able’ and ‘incomprehensible’ (EA, 319/4). Every inite 
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existence, every limited duration or extension, be it 
that of an entire galaxy or a single human life, can 
igure as nothing more than a vanishing quantity and 
an evanescent episode, when considered from the 
sublime perspective of the ininite.
Blanqui’s second move draws on the results of the 
spectral analysis of his day, which conirmed that all 
material entities are composed from a small number 
of basic elements. From sand to stars, everything is 
made of the same elemental stuf. ‘The forms are 
innumerable, the elements are the same’, and so are 
the laws of motion and combination that afect them, 
to the exclusion of all ‘chaos’. So far we have distin-
guished sixty-odd basic chemical elements on earth, 
and Blanqui speculates that there may be around 
forty more in the universe as a whole. 
Along with an end to any existential basis for 
‘chimera’ like spirits or deities, Blanqui further 
assumes that the inite number of material elements 
justiies his inference that the number of their pos-
sible combinations, however large, must be inite as 
well. He recognizes the immense diversity of species 
and individuals but guesses that, from one galaxy to 
another, the basic ‘causes of diversity remain fairly 
weak’, since everywhere we ind ‘the same matter, 
classiied and organized by the same method, accord-
ing to the same order. Its foundations and its govern-
ment are identical’ (358/37tm). By deinition, no inite 
amount of variety can ever begin to approach the 
limit marked by actual ininity. Although the number 
of possible combinations of elements is indeed astro-
nomical and ‘incalculable’, Blanqui assumes that it 
must nevertheless be inite (360/40). 
Since time and space are ininite, the crux of 
Blanqui’s argument appears to follow as a matter 
of course: the limited set of possible combinations 
must repeat, over ininite time and ininite space, 
in ininitely many copies or reiterations. Since time 
has always already been under way and is without 
origin or end, so there can never be or have been 
any properly ‘new’ types or combinations. Stars are 
born, expand and die, along with the planets, organ-
isms and histories these may support, generating an 
endless supply of further stars and planets along the 
way, but every ‘new’ star can only ever repeat one or 
another of the originary types. However, as some 
of Blanqui’s irst readers immediately pointed out, 
his efectively ‘atomic’ or building-block approach to 
material entities as combinations of a limited set of 
basic elements leads him to neglect the possibility of 
progressively evolving combinations of combinations, 
composed over the course of unfolding time, which 
might then be understood as generating a series of 
entities no less unending than time itself.29
The rest of Eternity revels in the dizzying implica-
tions of its inaugural thesis. The number of actual 
living and human beings must be inite, and thus 
trivially small in relation to the ‘ininite quantity of 
identical planets’ on which they live, have lived or 
will live. 
It follows that each earth, containing one of these 
particular human collectives as the result of inces-
sant alterations, has to be repeated billions of 
times to meet the ininite’s demands. From there, 
billions of earths are absolute copies or twins in 
matter and personnel, without a hair’s diference in 
time or place – not by a millionth of a second nor a 
spider’s thread. (EA, 373/51)
Every actual human being is likewise one of a multi-
tude of identical copies or twins. 
What I write at this moment in the dungeons of 
Fort du Taureau I will have written for eternity, on 
a table, with a pen, in my clothes, in circumstances 
that are completely alike. And so it is, for everyone.
(EA, 380/57) 
This eternity applies, moreover – since the ininite 
is ininitely inexhaustible – not only to every cur-
rently existing human being and the course of every 
actually accomplished life, but to every possible vari-
ation of every human being and their every possible 
alternative life. Everything you have done you will do 
again ininitely many other times, and are currently 
doing in ininitely many other places – and the same 
applies for what you (and every variation on you) 
might have done, or may yet do, in every diferent 
iteration of our world. 
In this way, every one of us has lived, lives, and 
will live endlessly according to a billion forms of 
an alter ego. As one is at each second of life, so one 
is stereotyped [stéréotypé] in eternity in billions of 
copies. (EA, 377/55)
Who could deny, Blanqui readily admits, the 
mono tonous quality of a universe purged of any 
novelty or chaotic modiication? 
Always and everywhere, on this earthly camp it’s 
the same drama, the same setting, on the same, 
narrow stage … The same monotony and the same 
immobilisme … The universe is repeated without 
end, it paws the ground in the same place. Eternity 
imperturbably plays the same representations over 
and over, ad ininitum. (EA, 382/58–9) 
Past barbarisms will return, along with their 
genesis and suspension. ‘On billions of earths, the 
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future will again see all the acts of ignorance, the 
foolishness, and the cruelty of our previous ages!’ 
(382/58). And who, then, could deny the ‘melan-
cholic’ quality of such an eternity, the ‘sadness’ of 
our separation from our every extra-galactic twin? 
For any individual struggling to decide on a course 
of action, 
it’s true that his twins don’t sound the alarm for 
him. That’s the terrible thing! One cannot be 
warned … So many identical populations that pass 
without one having suspected their mutual exist-
ence! (EA, 367/46, 380–81/58)
Benjamin’s Blanqui
Understandably, perhaps, Blanqui’s politically 
minded readers have generally paid little attention to 
his one-of exercise in amateur cosmology. Maurice 
Dommanget’s magisterial survey of his social and 
political thought hardly mentions Eternity, and 
Samuel Bernstein’s book on Blanqui (which remains 
the most detailed English-language study) considers 
it for one brief paragraph, before concluding that 
it ofers little more than ‘proof of diligent efort to 
banish himself as far as possible from earth and 
politics’.30 The only major exception was also the only 
major Marxian thinker who tried to take Blanqui 
seriously, at a time when revolutionary politics were 
themselves plunging into full-blown crisis: Walter 
Benjamin.
To Benjamin’s enduring credit, and very much 
against the prevailing tendencies of his day, he 
remembered that ‘in the nineteenth century no 
one else had a revolutionary authority comparable 
to Blanqui’s.’31 He recognized that it is now ‘hardly 
possible to overestimate the revolutionary prestige 
which Blanqui … preserved up to his death. Before 
Lenin, there was no one else who had a clearer proile 
among the proletariat.’32 It had taken Europe’s social 
democrats only ‘three decades to erase the name 
of Blanqui almost entirely’, he observed in 1940, a 
name ‘whose resounding call [Erzklang] had made 
the preceding century tremble’.33 Nevertheless, no 
one else had so clearly anticipated what Benjamin 
himself would formulate as ‘the experience of our 
generation: that capitalism will not die a natural 
death’.34 Arguably, no other thinker did more to 
connect the ‘three moments’ that Benjamin was to 
identify, in a late note, as fundamental to ‘the mate-
rialist conception of history: the discontinuity of 
historical time; the destructive power of the working 
class; the tradition of the oppressed.’35 Writing in 
his Paris exile in the late 1930s, at the height of 
both fascist and Stalinist reaction, Benjamin was well 
placed to appreciate how Blanqui’s approach might 
allow ‘politics to attain primacy over history’, and 
how political deiance might endure in a period of 
profound historical discouragement.36 By retaining a 
link with Blanqui, Benjamin helped to correct Marx’s 
one-sided dismissal of the conspiratorial ‘alchemists 
of revolution’,37 to say nothing of Engels’s late, irmly 
anti-Blanquist reformulation of the Marxian project 
along proto-reformist lines.38
However, Benjamin’s idiosyncratic patronage 
of Blanqui was and remains very much a mixed 
blessing. For one thing, it has helped to cement the 
reputation of Blanqui’s minor astronomical provoca-
tion as an apparent ‘key’ to his œuvre as a whole. 
More importantly, whereas Blanqui actually staked 
his revolutionary hopes on principled consistency, 
careful organization and the cumulative promise 
of mass education, Benjamin emphasizes the mes-
sianic potential of moments of ‘catastrophe’. What 
fascinates him about Blanqui are less his insights 
into the oppressive machinery of his society or the 
steps that he took in order to change it, and more 
his quasi-mythical status as a igure of damned isola-
tion and untimely interruption, the ‘pariah’ of his 
epoch.39 More precisely, he appears as a pariah whose 
political life ends with an abrupt admission of defeat. 
Benjamin’s irst reference to Eternity already reads 
it as a gesture of both protest and submission to 
its author’s ‘infernal’ social world, as a ‘complement 
of the society to which Blanqui, in his old age, was 
forced to concede victory … It is an unconditional 
surrender’, even if it is ‘simultaneously the most ter-
rible indictment of [his] society’.40 
Benjamin reiterates the point in his most detailed 
discussion of the text, in the ‘1939 Exposé’ of his 
Arcades Project. Blanqui’s Eternity is ‘a vision of hell’, 
and the irony of its formulation – ‘an irony which 
doubtless escaped the author himself – is that the 
terrible indictment he pronounces against society 
takes the form of an unqualiied submission to its 
results’.41 No doubt it has a ‘tragic grandeur’, but 
Blanqui’s ‘betrayal’ leaves him apparently trapped 
within the dominant ‘phantasmagoria’ of his day, 
within the logic of indiferent repetition and mass 
production.42 In Eternity:
humanity igures as damned. Everything new it 
could hope for turns out to be a reality that has 
always been present; and this newness will be as 
little capable of furnishing it with a liberating 
solution as a new fashion is capable of rejuvenating 
society.43 
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Glossing Blanqui’s evocation of eternal repetition 
and his rejection of progress, Benjamin concludes:
this resignation without hope is the last word of 
the great revolutionary. The [nineteenth] century 
was incapable of responding to the new techno-
logical possibilities with a new social order. … In 
the end, Blanqui views novelty as an attribute of all 
that is under sentence of damnation.44 
Would it not be more fruitful to read Blanqui on 
repetition in the light of what Trotsky or Gramsci 
had to say about Calvinist doctrines of predestina-
tion, considered as a strategy for defending political 
volition ‘when in a weak position’.45
Benjamin’s appreciation of Blanqui’s cosmo-
mythology has had another unfortunate side efect, 
anticipated in his 1938 letters to Horkheimer and 
developed in considerable detail by subsequent 
readers – an insistence on its apparent proximity to 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return.46 It’s true that 
Nietzsche, like Blanqui, reviled that ‘admiration for 
the “power of history” which in practice transforms 
every moment into a naked admiration for success 
and leads to an idolatry of the factual’.47 It’s also true 
that when he comes to articulate his own visions of 
‘the eternal return of the same’ and the ‘ininitely 
reiterated circulation of all things’,48 around ten years 
after Blanqui, Nietzsche also revels in the vertigo 
efect induced by the principle of ininity or endless-
ness. Both authors stage scenarios in which eternal 
repetition applies to every lived experience, down to 
that ‘spider’s thread’ (Blanqui) or ‘this spider and this 
moonlight between the trees’ (Nietzsche). Blanqui’s 
most recent editor concludes: 
both Blanqui and Nietzsche are committed to some 
sort of determinism, that is to say, at least to some 
idea that the possible and the necessary are equiva-
lent (Nietzsche calls this unity ‘fate’).49
Such comparisons are profoundly misleading. The 
lack of evidence for any direct inluence of Blanqui 
on Nietzsche is neither here nor there. But leaving 
aside the fact that Nietzsche’s reactionary political 
principles oppose those airmed by Blanqui on every 
point, his conception of repetition also difers in 
two fundamental respects. First, whereas Blanqui’s 
ininity absorbs both what is actual and what might 
be possible in a single array of endless variations, 
Nietzsche’s repetition is expressly limited to what 
is made actual, and serves in efect to consecrate or 
immortalize it. 
This life as you now live it and have lived it you 
will have to live once again and innumerable times 
again; and there will be nothing new in it, but 
every pain and every joy and every thought and 
sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in 
your life must return to you, all in the same suc-
cession and sequence.50 
Any future variation on what you might do or 
might have done is excluded in advance. Second, 
Blanqui’s vision is ‘seen’ from an altogether inhuman 
or cosmic perspective, one that embraces the endless 
succession of stars and galaxies on their own terms, 
such that what happens to the innumerable ‘copies 
[sosies]’ of yourself that may be scattered through 
these galaxies can be of no existential consequence 
to the inite you as such, living your life at this time 
and on this world. You can know nothing of your 
other ‘selves’, except that, by implication, they will 
incarnate and will have already incarnated every 
possible variation on your own course of action (to 
the point of exploding any imaginable coherence 
of ‘one’ underlying self). For Nietzsche, by contrast, 
return igures as the greatest psychological ‘test’ that 
a person can confront, and consolidates the deep 
integrity of one’s self still more than the old classical 
theme of self-revelation at the hour of one’s death. 
Blanqui’s vision applies without exception to all that 
exists or could exist, and is of no signiicance for 
what you will or should do here and now; Nietzsche’s 
myth, on the other hand, is designed to separate the 
many who might be crushed by ‘the heaviest weight’ 
from those few who might embrace and carry it, 
sustained by their unconditional airmation of the 
way they live.51
Nietzsche’s whole efort, in short, is to align one’s 
own decisions and actions, one’s deepest purpose, 
with the essential nature of the cosmos itself, in a 
single uniied ield, a single ‘will to power’, so as to 
be able to airm: ‘thus my eternal fate wills it!’52 
Nietzsche claims to live his philosophy ‘experimen-
tally’, and what this philosophy wants or wills is 
precisely amor fati, an unconditional ‘airmation of 
the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or 
selection – it wants the eternal circulation: the same 
things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements.’53 
Nietzsche lives the unity of cosmos and self; Blanqui 
divides these two dimensions without remainder.
Blanqui’s voluntarism
This is the point that Benjamin’s pessimistic inter-
pretation of Eternity fails to grasp, and that needs 
to be remembered if we are to make proper sense of 
its place in Blanqui’s broader project. For Blanqui, 
unlike Nietzsche (to say nothing of a neo-Nietzschean 
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naturalist like Deleuze), there is simply no common 
measure between cosmic or natural necessity on the 
one hand and the constrained domain of human 
freedoms on the other. As Blanqui pointed out in 
a note written in 1868, and then used almost word 
for word in the manuscript of Eternity, ‘the word law 
only makes sense in nature. Whoever says Law means 
an invariable, immanent and fatal rule – a principle 
that is immediately incompatible with intelligence 
and will’, and also with the ‘capricious and arbitrary’ 
passions that condition their exercise. ‘What we call 
law, where people are concerned, is nothing other 
than the expression of the will of the strongest [la 
volonté du plus fort].’54
Benjamin condemns Eternity for failing to counter 
the socio-historical tendencies that consolidate rep-
etition and trivial variation as dimensions of our 
increasingly commodiied and administered life – but 
he does so only because he opts to read the text from 
the cosmic rather than the human or political point 
of view. As soon as it is considered from this latter 
perspective, it becomes clear that the whole point 
of Blanqui’s Eternity is to show that ‘nature doesn’t 
bother with us’ (EA, 376/53tm) – and since nature 
largely leaves us alone to get on with our lives as we 
choose, so then we are free to make and remake the 
course of our own history, which is the only history 
that matters. All natural laws are indeed ‘inlexible 
and immutable’, and so long as natural laws are left 
to ‘govern alone then everything follows a course that 
is ixed and fated. But variations do begin to take 
place with animate beings that have will, or in other 
words, caprice. Above all, as soon as people intervene, 
fantasy intervenes with them.’ Human fantasie can 
make little impact on nature itself, no doubt, but 
‘while the turbulence they create never seriously 
upsets the natural course of physical phenomena, 
it does upset humanity. So it’s necessary then to 
foresee this subversive inluence’ that can ‘change the 
course of individual destinies’ as much as it can ‘tear 
nations apart and topple empires’ (370/49). This is 
where Blanqui’s essential dualism reasserts itself, and 
disrupts any proto-Nietzschean alignment between 
volition and fate.
It is among people themselves that victims are 
made and people are driven to immense changes. 
It’s when they are carried away by passion and 
other competing interests that their species gets 
stirred up with a violence that’s greater than an 
ocean beneath the toil and strain of a tempest. 
What a diference in the course of humanities! It 
is a diference that nevertheless began its career 
with the same personnel, due to an identity in the 
material conditions of the planets. (EA, 371/49)
The immutable cosmic order of things, in short, is 
simply irrelevant to both the individual choices we 
make and the collective arrangements in which we 
participate. What is most important in one’s own 
life or history certainly counts for nothing from the 
perspective of ininite variation and return – but the 
indiference is symmetrical, and leaves the domain 
of our political priorities and possibilities thoroughly 
untouched. As Jacques Rancière notes, in the conclu-
sion of his own relections on Eternity, ‘what other 
revolutionary, of thought or action, has ever proposed 
such a radical gap between the “objective conditions” 
of action and the courage of his enterprise?’55 
There is no contradiction, then, between the ‘mel-
ancholic’ cosmology explored in the 1872 booklet, 
and Blanqui’s insistence three years before, that the 
sequence ‘driving human things is not inevitable 
[fatal] like that of the universe, it can be changed at 
any moment.’56 Blanqui emphasizes the point within 
the text of Eternity itself, in lines that Benjamin never 
appears to consider. Every time a life-bearing planet 
takes shape, and every time humanity evolves on 
such a planet, 
every minute and every second, thousands of dif-
ferent directions are set before this human race. 
It chooses one of them, forever abandoning the 
others. Such sidetracks and divergences – the right 
and the left alter individuals, alter history!
These irreversible and irreducible choices condition 
the whole of human existence, regardless of scale. 
However perfectly the world we have shaped thus far 
may have been (and will be) copied in other worlds 
in other spaces and at other times, still the path or 
‘chapter of bifurcations’ opens again with every new 
decision. If we could observe an exact copy of our 
world as it has existed thus far, Blanqui insists, still it 
would tell us nothing about what is about to happen 
here and now:
Here is a complete copy – the things and people. 
No stone, tree, or brook; no animal, human, or 
incident that has not found its place and moment 
in this duplicate. It’s a genuine copy or twin-earth 
[terre-sosie] – at least until today. For tomorrow, 
the events and the people will follow their course. 
Henceforth, for us, it’s the unknown. Our Earth’s 
future, like its past, will change its course millions 
of times. (EA, 362/43)
No doubt the world we are about to choose and 
shape will in turn be repeated, in ininitely many 
43
iterations, like every other possible world – but that’s 
not to say that our actual decisions in this world 
are predetermined by any sort of causal power, be it 
natural or historical. Decisions are decided by those 
who have acquired, in practice, the practical capacity 
to take and to implement them, and not by some 
higher or more fundamental logic or necessity (and 
still less, in the absence of the latter, by the play of 
mere chance or hasard). What we decide remains a 
matter of freedom and volition, as much at the level 
of the individual as at the level of social development 
or political transformation. If natural events unfold 
with law-like regularity, 
it isn’t the events alone that create human vari-
ants. Is there a person who hasn’t now and then 
found himself confronted with two careers? And 
the one he turns away from would indeed make 
his life diferent, while still leaving him the same 
individuality. One leads to misery, shame, bondage, 
and servitude. The other leads to glory and liberty. 
(364/43)
This is the sort of alternative that preoccupies 
Blanqui. If, then, regardless of what or how one might 
choose, one ‘cannot escape fatality’, what Blanqui 
means in this particular context is simply that once 
a choice is taken, there is indeed no escaping the 
consequences it entails for the one who takes it. To 
choose ‘revolution or death’ is certainly to renounce 
other alternatives: that these alternatives may be or 
may have already been chosen by other variations of 
oneself, in other worlds and at other times, can never 
afect any actual instance of choice. In other copies 
of our world, ‘perhaps the English lost the battle of 
Waterloo many times’, in any number of ways (365/44) 
– but our world is the only one that can matter to us, 
and our future can no more be anticipated in advance 
than our past can be undone.
 Blanqui’s hypothesis may indeed suggest that 
only the path of ‘bifurcations is still open to hope or 
expectation [espérance]’ (EA, 381/57), but that is the 
only basis for action that free actors require. If there 
is anything that might ‘sufer’ the fate of cosmic 
necessity, then so far as Blanqui’s vision is concerned, 
strictly speaking it can could be understood as a 
‘tragedy’ only ‘for the stars’ themselves, obliged to 
submit to the endless cycle of their reincarnation 
without progress or sense. ‘Only the stars would be 
entitled to complain’, Blanqui acknowledges – ‘but 
they don’t’ (377/54).
Blanqui’s critique of fatalism shouldn’t be inlated, 
then, to imply a critique of progress tout court. 
Blanqui grants that there can be no progress over 
the course of ininite time, by deinition, but the 
inite lifetime of a planet can certainly be punctu-
ated by sequences of political progress or regress. 
For Blanqui, the return of classical and proto-atheist 
references with the Renaissance certainly marked 
a great step forward with respect to the reaction-
ary Middle Ages, as did the Enlightenment over the 
Counter-Reformation; the Revolution and Terror of 
1789–93 likewise marked an unprecedented advance 
over the powers of tyranny and superstition, and 
their agents persist as models of revolutionary vigour 
and lucidity.57 The argument of Eternity does nothing 
to refute this, since if ‘there is no progress’ at the level 
of the universe as a whole this is simply because ‘what 
we call “progress” is shut away in each particular 
world’ (EA, 382/58tm) – which is where it belongs. 
Even the ‘melancholic’ implications Blanqui infers 
from the cosmic distances that separate one planet 
from another need not apply within the conines 
of a particular planet, where the efort to build ever 
more inclusive forms of association, and ever more 
adequate ways of sharing knowledge, is precisely the 
task that identiies ‘communism as the future of 
society’ – that is, as the future of our planet.58
Blanqui’s perspective, in Eternity as elsewhere, 
should be understood as neither defeatist nor simply 
deiant. Blanqui’s emancipatory project had many 
limitations, but the general approach he defends is a 
consistent and thoroughgoing voluntarism, and it is 
all the better for it.
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